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UNHRC Resolution 26/9: Is a New International “Red
Card” Enough to Keep FIFA and Others Accountable?
Griffin A. Clark

Abstract
The lead-up to the 2022 FIFA World Cup in Qatar has generated significant controversy
due to the host country’s exploitative labor system and sub-standard human rights record. While
FIFA has not remained completely insulated from criticism for its involvement, the sport’s
principal governing body has avoided all serious threats of liability for its connection to human
rights violations associated with the 2022 World Cup. This immunity largely stems from
limitations on domestic courts in adjudicating domestic corporations’ foreign business activities.
Yet, the ongoing development of a new treaty under the U.N. offers a different approach to
liability for transnational business activities. Using U.N. Human Rights Council Resolution
26/9 and its proposed legally binding instrument as a new avenue for transnational corporate
accountability, this Comment examines FIFA’s liability for human rights violations in Qatar
connected to the World Cup. Further, this Comment concludes that FIFA can be held liable in
its domicile for its transnational business activities in Qatar. The organization’s business
relationship with Qatar, through the tournament, establishes a sufficient link to attach liability
for the related human rights violations. Although questions persist as to exactly how this treaty
will operate, it is apparent that FIFA’s absolute immunity is fading. Finally, this Comment
shifts away from the 2022 World Cup as a case study for liability and explores the practical
implications of expanding corporate liability for FIFA and other transnational corporations’
future business activities. The expansion of a hard law regime in this area raises issues
surrounding the chilling of foreign investment by increasing compliance costs. While the
appropriate balancing of these considerations is contentious, this Comment argues that, in
FIFA’s case, the expansion of transnational corporate liability likely will not produce significant
adverse effects on its investment in developing countries through “the beautiful game.”



I would like to thank CJIL for the opportunity to publish this Comment. I would also like to thank
my faculty advisor, Professor Chilton, for his ideas and insights during the development of this
Comment.
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I. I NTRODU C TION
On December 2, 2010, Fédération Internationale de Football Association
(FIFA) shocked fans around the world when it announced that Qatar had won
the hosting rights to the 2022 FIFA World Cup (World Cup).1 FIFA, the
international governing body of soccer, is a nongovernmental organization
(NGO) incorporated in Switzerland and comprised of a single member
association from each participating country. FIFA’s mission is to support the
development and promotion of soccer.2 In addition, FIFA awards, organizes, and
implements the FIFA World Cup, a quadrennial international soccer tournament
in which national teams from around the globe compete. Before FIFA awards
World Cup hosting rights, however, it requires each country to submit a formal
bid and hosting agreement to FIFA for evaluation.3 When FIFA’s Executive
Committee voted to award the 2022 World Cup to Qatar, initial concerns about
the integrity of the voting process bled into concerns about Qatar’s ability to
successfully host the tournament.4 Now, it is well established that a corrupt
bidding process influenced the 2022 World Cup host selection.5 Yet, the purpose
of this Comment is not to address FIFA’s inadequate corporate governance
structure that enabled corruption at the bidding stage; rather, this Comment seeks
to evaluate a new avenue for liability for FIFA due to the organization’s
involvement in human rights violations in Qatar during the lead-up to the World
Cup.
In order to host the 2022 World Cup, the Persian Gulf nation needed to
construct significant infrastructure, including stadiums, hotels, and
1

See Press Release, FIFA, 2022 FIFA World Cup Awarded to Qatar (Dec. 2, 2010),
https://perma.cc/HF3Z-97LZ.

2

See Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA), FIFA STATUTES 10 (June 2019),
https://perma.cc/6W6A-R35G (adding that its objectives are to promote soccer “in light of its
unifying, educational, cultural, and humanitarian values”). But see Rachael E. Bandeira, Note, FIFA:
For the Game or For-Profit?, 51 NEW ENG. L. REV. 423, 423–24 (2017) (stressing that a breakdown of
FIFA’s expenses and revenues shows that the organization focuses on turning a profit rather than
promoting social values through sport).
See FIFA, 2022 FIFA WORLD CUP BID EVALUATION REPORT: QATAR 4–6 (2010),
https://perma.cc/8BWU-MVLL.
See Jere Longman, Russia and Qatar Win World Cup Bids, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 2, 2010),
https://perma.cc/CR7G-X9N9 (pointing out that the U.S. lost despite having a “technically
superior bid”); FIFA, EVALUATION REPORTS ON THE BIDS FOR THE 2018 AND 2022 FIFA WORLD
CUP 9 (2010), https://perma.cc/5DGN-YGZT (denoting Qatar as the only bid to carry a “high”
operational risk) [hereinafter EVALUATION REPORTS].
See Tariq Panja & Kevin Draper, U.S. Says FIFA Officials Were Bribed to Award World Cups to Russia
and Qatar, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 6, 2020), https://perma.cc/GMY6-C7EF (“[R]epresentatives working
for Russia and Qatar had bribed FIFA officials to secure hosting rights for the World Cup.”).

3

4

5
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transportation.6 To satisfy the increased labor demand for large-scale
infrastructure projects, Qatar has relied on migrant workers who have traditionally
flocked from “South and South-East Asia, including Bangladesh, India, Indonesia,
Nepal, Pakistan, the Philippines and Sri Lanka” to take advantage of promising
economic opportunities outside of their own countries.7 But Qatar’s grossly
inadequate labor standards and exploitative Kafala—meaning sponsorship—
system restricted worker freedoms and allowed employers to exert significant
control over migrant laborers.8 Issues such as inhumane working conditions,
unpaid or late wages, and passport confiscation frequently plagued migrant
workers in Qatar.9 Although a facial distinction between legal and illegal practices
exists with respect to Qatar’s labor system, in practice, the two coexist in an
intertwined relationship that bars any meaningful line-drawing. For example,
delayed or unpaid wages to workers are prohibited under Qatari law; however,
weak labor protection laws, ineffective judicial oversight, and the Kafala system
perpetuate these abuses by prioritizing employer control over migrant rights.10
Although Qatar signed a technical agreement with the International Labour
Organization (ILO) on November 8, 2017 to implement sweeping labor reforms
throughout the country, recent reports suggest that the reforms have not fully
addressed Qatar’s restrictive labor governance system.11
6

7

8

9

10

11

See FIFA, supra note 3, at 9 (“[T]he bid is largely based on projected generic and event-specific
infrastructure.”).
François Crépeau (Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants), Report of the Special
Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants 4, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/26/35/Add.1 (Apr. 23, 2014);
AMNESTY INT’L, REALITY CHECK: THE STATE OF MIGRANT WORKERS RIGHTS WITH FOUR YEARS
TO GO UNTIL THE QATAR 2022 WORLD CUP 5 (2019), https://perma.cc/2HMB-2KHW (noting
that Qatar’s migrant worker population has increased since 2010 in part because of the construction
boom in preparation for the World Cup) [hereinafter REALITY CHECK].
See Paula Renkiewicz, Comment, Sweat Makes the Grass Grow Greener: The Precarious Future of Qatar’s
Migrant Workers in the Run up to the 2022 FIFA World Cup under the Kafala System and Recommendations
for Effective Reform, 65 AM. U. L. REV. 721, 733–34 (2016) (noting that the Kafala system serves as an
employer sponsorship system for migrant workers in which the sponsor controls the workers’
ability to enter Qatar, transfer employment, and leave Qatar).
See Michael B. Engle, Note, A CN Tower over Qatar: An Analysis of the Use of Slave Labor in Preparation
for the 2022 FIFA Men’s World Cup and How the European Court of Human Rights Can Stop It, 32
HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 177, 181–84 (2014).
See Law No. (14) of the Year 2004 – Qatar Labor Law art. 50 (requiring employers to pay earned
wages to employees). See also François Crépeau, supra note 7 (“Exploitation [in Qatar] is frequent
and migrants often work without pay and live in substandard conditions.”).
Compare Dismantling the Kafala System and Introducing a Minimum Wage Mark New Era for Qatar Labour
Market, INT’L LAB. ORG. (Aug. 30, 2020), https://perma.cc/82JK-EXNC (noting that Qatar’s
recent labor reforms including eliminating the exit permit requirement and enabling greater
employment mobility within the county), with Qatar: Significant Labor and Kafala Reforms, HUM. RTS.
WATCH (Sept. 24, 2020, 8:00 AM), https://perma.cc/VJ95-5LC3 (emphasizing that, even with the
reforms, remaining factors such as the prohibition against unions for migrant workers facilitate
labor abuse).
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Due to the difficulty in obtaining accurate labor information from Qatar, the
exact scope of migrant worker labor and human rights abuses is unknown. In June
2020, an investigative report by Amnesty International revealed that around 100
migrant workers at the Al Bayt World Cup Stadium project “had not been paid
for up to seven months,” with the delays leading to “great hardship amongst the
workers.”12 Furthermore, an article published in 2019 in the periodical, Cardiology,
examined the relationship between 571 cardiovascular-related deaths among
Nepalese migrant laborers in Qatar from 2009 to 2017 and heat exposure from
working outside on infrastructure projects during the same time period.13 The
researchers ultimately concluded that the dramatic increase in cardiovascular
mortality rates during the summer among Nepalese migrant workers in Qatar “is
most likely due to severe heat stress.”14 During the summer months in Qatar,
prolonged exposure to the heat while outdoors increases the risk of heat stress,
especially for those engaging in physically demanding construction labor. 15 The
article concluded that “as many as 200 [deaths] . . . could have been prevented if
effective heat protection measures had been implemented.”16 Thus, with the
World Cup less than two years away, the issue of human rights violations in Qatar
in connection to the tournament persists.
While some groups have made efforts to impose liability on FIFA in
connection to World Cup human rights violations, no party has successfully
litigated the issue in court.17 Under current international law, FIFA’s activities are
practically immune from liability claims. This is likely because international human
rights law neither imposes an affirmative obligation on nations to police the
foreign business activities of their domestic corporations nor mandates
jurisdiction to hear these claims.18 This immunity, however, may be short-lived; in
2014, the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) mandated the
development of a legally binding instrument to regulate the business activities of

12

13

14
15

16
17

18

AMNESTY INT’L, REALITY CHECK 2020: COUNTDOWN TO THE 2022 WORLD CUP 28 (2020),
https://perma.cc/UPN8-NFMK.
Bandana Pradhan et al., Heat Stress Impacts on Cardiac Mortality in Nepali Migrant Workers in Qatar, 143
CARDIOLOGY 37, 37–48 (2019).
Id. at 47.
See Qatar: Take Urgent Action to Protect Construction Workers, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Sept. 17, 2017),
https://perma.cc/G7LJ-2QRW.
Id. See also AMNESTY INT’L, ALL WORK, NO PAY (2019), https://perma.cc/39PB-8FXH.
See Press Release, FIFA, Swiss Court Rejects Labour Unions’ Claim against FIFA concerning Qatar
2022 (2017), https://perma.cc/2A5Q-2KXC.
See U.N. OFFICE HIGH COMM’R, GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS:
IMPLEMENTING THE UNITED NATIONS “PROTECT, RESPECT AND REMEDY” FRAMEWORK 3–4
(2011), https://perma.cc/45JG-SPQR.
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transnational entities.19 With the completion of the third draft version of the
Transnational Corporate Liability Treaty (TCLT), the expansion of liability for
transnational business activities may be on the horizon. FIFA will not be able to
continue turning a blind eye to its involvement in the perpetuation of human
rights and labor abuses in Qatar. Therefore, this Comment seeks to answer two
questions: (1) Whether, under the UNHRC Resolution 26/9 and the proposed
treaty, FIFA can be held liable for human rights violations in connection with the
2022 World Cup; and, if so, (2) whether expanding corporate liability under
international law, as it relates to FIFA’s involvement in the World Cup and other
transnational corporate business activities, is a desirable outcome.
FIFA’s liability for human rights violations from the World Cup raises
broader implications for transnational corporations and their business activities.
FIFA’s situation is unique due to its pervasive involvement and control over
almost every aspect of the World Cup. A typical transnational corporate business
activity will likely involve far less investment, control, and oversight. Still, the
application of the TCLT to FIFA provides a valuable framework for assessing
how a transnational corporation may find itself subject to liability for its activities
in a foreign nation. Expanding liability and access to remedies could affect all
companies engaged in business activities in areas with sub-standard human rights
protections. This places these entities at a crossroads—factor in the risk of liability
as a cost of business, avoid the opportunity altogether, or mitigate the risk of
human rights violations through greater internal governance and explicit
bargaining with the associated sovereign. Using the 2022 World Cup in Qatar as
a case study delineates the treaty’s likely procedural and substantive effects while
also providing valuable insight into how the TCLT could facilitate, or at least
incentivize, behavioral changes among many transnational corporations.
In Section II, this Comment begins with an assessment of the current
international framework for human rights and labor protections. Next, Section III
introduces UNHRC Resolution 26/9 and the establishment of the Open-Ended
Intergovernmental Working Group (OEIGWG). Section III also focuses on the
OEIGWG’s proposed legally binding instrument and how the instrument
delineates a new framework for international corporate liability and human rights
protections. Section IV then analyzes the nexus between FIFA, Qatar, and
migrant workers in the lead up to the World Cup. The analysis centers on the
contractual relationships between the three parties. Finally, Sections V, VI, and
VII explore the viability of using the proposed treaty to impose liability on FIFA
for the 2022 World Cup and the potential effects of the treaty’s application.

19

See Human Rights Council Res. 26/9, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/Res/26/9, at 2 (June 26, 2014)
(establishing a working group to develop the legally binding instrument) [hereinafter Human Rights
Council Res. 26/9].
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II. T HE R E LE VANT I NTE RNATIONAL H U MAN R IGHTS
F RAME WORK
Facially, international law recognizes and purports to protect human rights
through a myriad of multilateral treaties, conventions, and specialized
intergovernmental agencies. The United Nations (U.N.) has fostered the
development of this human rights framework by facilitating international
cooperation toward a common understanding of certain rights. Yet, this
cooperative framework is not perfect. Limitations on jurisdiction and nations’
varying standards and degrees of implementation of safeguards have diminished
accountability for entities engaging in transnational business activities that carry
significant human rights risks. International cooperation toward the development
of a consistent and effective system for preventing, eliminating, and punishing
human rights violations is limited by considerations of territoriality and state
sovereignty. States may wish to police their internal affairs in a manner different
from others. Imposing a standardized adjudicatory framework infringes upon an
individual state’s right to regulate conduct occurring within its borders as it sees
fit.
This Section assesses the current international framework for human rights
and identifies gaps in the framework that hinder effective protection against
violations occurring in the context of transnational business activities.

A. U.N. Human Rights Council
In 2006, the U.N. established the UNHRC to serve as the world’s
intergovernmental entity for addressing and resolving human rights issues. 20
Buttressed by a broad mandate to promote “universal respect for the protection
of all human rights,” the Council’s oversight extends to any human rights issue in
any state.21 The Council consists of forty-seven member states, each elected to
three-year terms, that vote on the adoption of resolutions involving particular
states, regions, or human rights issues. Notably, Qatar’s seat expired on December
31, 2020, and Switzerland’s seat expired in 2018. Council resolutions are
significant expressions of political pressure by members but do not impose legal
obligations upon any state. The Council’s primary enforcement powers consist of
“naming and/or shaming a State that is engaged in human rights abuses.” 22
Although this process often places substantial compliance pressure on the

21

See Sarah Joseph & Eleanor Jenkin, The United Nations Human Rights Council: Is the United States Right
to Leave This Club, 35 AM. U. INT’L REV. 75, 76 (2019) (adding that the Council replaced the U.N.
Commission on Human Rights as the governing entity for human rights issues at the international
level).
G.A. Res. 60/251, ¶¶ 2, 5 (Apr. 3, 2006).

22

See Joseph & Jenkin, supra note 20, at 83–84.

20
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targeted state, the Council cannot legally bind the state to the Council’s decisions.
If a state refuses to cooperate and resolve these issues, the Council lacks
enforcement capabilities.
Furthermore, critics have called into question the Council’s effectiveness at
addressing human rights issues. The Council’s selectivity towards certain states
and politicization of human rights issues to further national interests threaten to
undermine the Council’s overall credibility and effectiveness.23 Qatar, a nation that
has perpetuated human rights abuses against migrant laborers over the last decade,
held a seat on the Council for the last three years, suggesting an acute hypocrisy
between the Council’s purported objectives and its members’ individual national
policies. These broader criticisms undermine the idea that the Council’s general
oversight is the appropriate mechanism for addressing human rights violations in
the context of transnational business activities.

B. International Labour Organization
Created in 1919 as a part of the Treaty of Versailles,24 the International
Labour Organization (ILO) is a specialized agency of the U.N. that works to
promote internationally recognized labor rights. The tripartite organization brings
together governments, employers, and workers’ organizations to set labor
standards and develop appropriate labor policies and programs.25 The ILO
Governing Body has passed eight fundamental conventions regarding principles
and rights at work. Most notably, the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining
Convention guarantees protection against anti-union discrimination and ensures
that employees are not subject to conditional employment based on union
membership.26 Further, the Protocol of 2014 to the Forced Labor Convention
requires each state to develop a national policy to suppress forced or compulsory
labor and protect migrant workers from possible abuses and fraudulent practices
during the recruitment and placement process.27 With these conventions and
protocols, the ILO purports to promote an international commitment to labor
protection and respect for all workers.

23

24
25
26

27

See id. at 103 (“States routinely direct excessive scrutiny at some countries, altogether ignore other
abusers, and shield yet others from action.”).
See, e.g., Treaty of Versailles, arts. 387–88, June 28, 1919.
See About the ILO, INT’L LAB. ORG. (ILO), https://perma.cc/C6EP-RPM7.
See ILO, Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention art. 1, ILO Doc. CO/98 (July 1,
1949).
See ILO, Protocol of 2014 to the Forced Labor Convention, 1930 art. 1, ILO Doc. PO/29 (June
11, 2014).
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Yet, the ILO has received criticism for being ineffective in actually enforcing
the standards it adopts.28 For example, countries do not have to record and report
to the ILO how they are implementing these standards.29 Nations can also record
certain reservations when adopting ILO Conventions.
In conjunction with setting labor standards and policies, the organization
investigates complaints filed by member states, delegates of labor organizations,
or the ILO Governing Body on its own motion. In this process, the ILO can
establish an independent Commission of Inquiry to investigate complaints.30 The
ILO reserves this inquiry for the most serious and persistent labor violations.
What constitutes serious and persistent labor violations is context-specific; for
example, the most recent Commission of Inquiry investigated “acts of violence,
other attacks, harassment, aggression . . . as well as interference by the authorities”
against workers’ organizations in Venezuela.31 Thus, the threshold for formal
investigation by the Commission of Inquiry does not turn necessarily on the type
of labor violations but rather on the scope and pervasiveness of the violations and
associated government involvement—or lack thereof. If the Commission of
Inquiry decides to take action, it may issue recommendations to remedy the labor
violations in the offending country. In the event that the nation does not comply,
the ILO Governing Body can ask the International Labor Conference—the
annual meeting of governments’, workers’, and employers’ delegates that sets the
ILO’s broader polices, adopts international labor standards, and discusses key
“social and labour questions”32—to take measures against the non-compliant
nation.33 This action may result in member states taking direct action to force

28

29
30

31

32
33

See Alan Hyde, The International Labor Organization in the Stag Hunt for Global Labor Rights, 3 L. &
ETHICS HUM. RTS. 153, 158 (noting that the ILO’s one attempt to impose sanctions on a country
was largely ineffective).
Id. at 158–59.
See Constitution of the International Labour Organization, June 28, 1919, pmbl., 49 Stat. 2712,
2713–14, 225 Consol. T.S. 373 [hereinafter ILO Constitution].
See REPORT OF THE COMMISSION OF INQUIRY APPOINTED UNDER ARTICLE 26 OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION TO EXAMINE THE OBSERVANCE
BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE BOLIVARIAN REPUBLIC OF VENEZUELA OF THE MINIMUM WAGE
FIXING MACHINERY CONVENTION, 1928 (NO. 26), THE FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION AND
PROTECTION OF THE RIGHT TO ORGANISE CONVENTION, 1948 (NO. 87), AND THE TRIPARTITE
CONSULTATION (INTERNATIONAL LABOUR STANDARDS) CONVENTION, 1976 (NO.144) 161–91
(2019), https://perma.cc/ZHY6-478J.
International Labour Conference, ILO, https://perma.cc/VZ58-4MNQ.
See ILO Constitution, supra note 30, art. 33 (highlighting that non-compliance with the
Commission’s recommendations can lead to direct measures by member states against the
offender).
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compliance through state sanctions. To date, the ILO has only established thirteen
Commissions of Inquiry.34
Although the ILO maintains avenues to address and resolve labor violations
on the international stage, ensuring compliance among its members is an elusive
goal. Moreover, the ILO deals directly with state actors, and often insufficient
labor protections in states shield transnational entities that benefit from
exploitative labor systems from liability. The perpetuation of labor violations at
the corporate level is a natural result of inadequate or adverse labor policies at the
national level. The absence of corporate accountability for transnational business
activities means there are zero incentives for profit-maximizing firms to incur
significant costs for implementing human rights protections in their transnational
operations.

III. L IABILITY F OR T RANSNATIONAL B U SINE SS A C TIVITIE S
The previous Section focuses on international human rights protections,
such as obligations created by international treaties and intergovernmental
organizations, and their interaction with state governments. These broader state
obligations do not adequately translate to regulatory efforts at the corporate level;
state sovereignty leads to inconsistencies in the implementation of domestic
human rights protections and hinders effective compliance. A transnational
corporation may choose to carry out a significant portion of its operations in a
foreign nation that disregards compliance with certain labor standards and does
not police human rights violations. If a corporation answers to no one for its
actions within a country, it likely will not possess any incentive to restructure its
business activities in that region. Increased oversight and compliance costs serve
as a natural deterrent to organizational change at the corporate level. This Section
examines recent efforts to align human rights protections at the national and
corporate level, including the development of the Transnational Corporate
Liability Treaty (TCLT) to govern this relationship.

A. U.N. Guiding Principles for Business and Human Rights
On July 6, 2011, the UNHRC officially endorsed the Guiding Principles for
Business and Human Rights (GPs)—a non-binding framework to address the
relationship between the corporate responsibility with respect to human rights and

34

More importantly, the Governing Body has invoked Article 33 only once in response to Myanmar’s
failure to take measures to end forced labor within its borders. See Complaints, ILO,
https://perma.cc/94KZ-UZ33.
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the state’s duty to regulate these entities.35 This framework responded to a growing
concern that weak national legislation was inadequate to effectively regulate and
prevent transnational corporations from adversely impacting human rights in
vulnerable markets and economies.36 Nations with deficient labor laws provided
an exploitative opportunity for corporations seeking to profit off of these
deficiencies and escape stronger regulatory scrutiny within their own domiciles.
The GPs grew out of an earlier U.N. mandate to “identify and clarify” standards
and practices across business and human rights stakeholders.37 Yet, after the
Council’s official endorsement, the GPs gained an authoritative stamp and
became the focal point for assessing the impacts that business activities can have
on human rights. The GPs are based on three foundational pillars: (1) the state
has a duty to protect against human rights abuses within its territory by third
parties;38 (2) business enterprises should avoid activities that negatively impact
human rights and seek to mitigate these adverse effects;39 and (3) the state must
take appropriate action to ensure remedies are available to victims.40 Using this
foundation, the GPs expand upon the principles by providing policy and
regulatory suggestions to operationalize the proposed framework. The GPs now
serve as the widely accepted framework for evaluating the relationship between
states, corporations, and human rights.41
Unfortunately, there are two significant impediments to achieving effective,
wide-spread compliance with the GPs. First, the GPs are not legally binding.
Rather, they serve as the foundational principles with which both states and
business entities should structure their affairs. The corporate responsibility to
respect human rights does not equate to an affirmative duty. As a result, states
must create laws to regulate human rights effects within business activities, if
desired.42 Second, transnational corporate entities may avoid domestic
enforcement because the state is unable or unwilling to regulate extraterritorial
35

36
37

38
39
40
41

42

Human Rights Council Res. 17/4, 2 (July 6, 2011) [hereinafter Human Rights Council Res. 17/4].
See John Ruggie (Special Representative of the Secretary-General), Report of the Special Representative
of the Secretary General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business
Enterprises, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/31, at 2–4 (Mar. 21, 2011).
See Human Rights Council Res. 17/4, supra note 35, at 1.
See Ruggie, supra note 35, at 3 (noting that, in 2005, shared knowledge across business and human
rights stakeholder groups was minute).
See U.N. OFFICE HIGH COMM’R , supra note 18, at 4.
See id. at 14.
See id. at 17–18.
See Larry Cata Backer, Moving Forward The UN Guiding Principles for Business and Human Rights: Between
Enterprise Social Norm, State Domestic Legal Orders, and the Treaty Law That Might Bind Them All, 38
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 457, 458 (2015).
See David Weissbrodt, Human Rights Standards Concerning Transnational Corporations and Other Entities,
23 MINN. J. IN’TL L. 135, 154 (2014).
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business activities.43 The primary concern of a state in the regulation of overseas
activities is the infringement upon another state’s sovereignty. For example, the
United States Supreme Court has expressed the view that unrestrained
extraterritorial application of U.S. law “creates a serious risk of interference with
a foreign nation’s ability independently to regulate its own commercial affairs.”44
In the context of Qatari courts consistently failing to provide migrant laborers
access to justice, a hands-off approach to foreign affairs can leave aggrieved,
marginalized parties without adequate alternative forums in which to bring suit.
To be sure, the presumption that foreign nations can adequately handle their own
internal affairs is a correct one;45 however, there is enough evidence to rebut that
presumption in Qatar’s.

B. U.N. Human Rights Council Resolution 26/9
On July 14, 2014, the UNHRC passed Resolution 26/9 and took concrete
steps toward ensuring adequate state protection of human rights in transnational
business activities.46 Resolution 26/9, although separate from the GPs, seeks to
govern the same relationship between human rights, corporations, and the state
as do the GPs. With this action, the Council acknowledged the important role that
transnational corporations play in fostering economic well-being and investment
in developing markets, while also calling attention to their potentially adverse
impacts on human rights.47 The mandate purported to take a firmer stance toward
state responsibility for preventing and mitigating human rights violations. Thus,
the Council called for the development of a legally binding instrument with the
intention of imposing new, international legal obligations within this sphere.48 This
treaty, however, is not undermining the GPs. Rather, it is strengthening and
improving the existing business and human rights responsibility framework at the
international level—a move that the GPs actually emphasized in their third pillar,
access to remedies.49 By improving access to effective remedies, the treaty aims to
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45
46
47
48
49

See id. at 484 (noting that practical issues such choice of law, statute of limitations, and standards of
proof may hinder effective state enforcement).
F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 165 (2004). See also Motorola Mobility
LLC v. AU Optronics Corp., 775 F.3d 816, 824–27 (7th Cir. 2015) (refusing to apply U.S. antitrust
laws to anticompetitive corporate behavior occurring overseas).
AU Optronics Corp., 775 F.3d at 824–25.
Human Rights Council Res. 26/9, supra note 19.
Id. at 2.
Id. (establishing a working group to develop the legally binding instrument).
See Emilio Rafael Izquierdo Miño (Chair-Rapporteur), Report on the Fifth Session of the Open-Ended
Intergovernmental Working Group on Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Respect to
Human Rights, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/43/55 (Jan. 9, 2020).
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achieve greater corporate accountability for associated injuries caused by business
activities50
Under Resolution 26/9, the Council established the Open-Ended
Intergovernmental Working Group on Transnational Corporation and Other
Business Enterprises with Respect to Human Rights (Working Group). In the
Working Group’s fifth session report, the Chair-Rapporteur noted that most
delegations stressed the necessity of a legally binding instrument at the
international level, regardless of domestic developments in business and human
rights laws.51 Although a final treaty does not yet exist, the Working Group has
engaged in significant negotiations with stakeholders during the drafting process,
including commencement of its sixth session and the recent production of the
second draft version of the TCLT. As it stands, the Working Group has submitted
its report on the seventh session to the UNHRC and completed a third draft. The
Working Group’s progress provides a roadmap for how the new instrument will
bolster state regulation of transnational business activities and affect parties such
as FIFA.
The Working Group’s proposed legally binding instrument, the TCLT,
acknowledges both a corporate responsibility to prevent, mitigate, and address
human rights abuses caused by the entity’s business activities as well as the state’s
role in ensuring compliance.52 The TCLT provides the framework for a more
expansive liability regime for transnational corporations. Under Article I, the
TCLT defines business activities as “any economic or other activity” by a natural
or legal person, such as a corporation, joint venture, state-owned enterprise, or
other business enterprise.53 Additionally, transnational business activities are
defined as business activities that extend across multiple states through planning,
preparation, design, and/or implementation.54 This determination focuses on the
“nexus between the activity and the effect it generates.”55 The TCLT guarantees
each individual the rights delineated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(UDHR) and ILO Conventions and Protocols.56 These include the right to life,

50
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53
54
55

56

See id. at 2.
See id. at 4.
OPEN-ENDED INTERGOVERNMENTAL WORKING GROUP, LEGALLY BINDING INSTRUMENT TO
REGULATE, IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, THE ACTIVITIES OF TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND
OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES 2–3 (August 17, 2021), https://perma.cc/82PJ-SLY7 [hereinafter
OEIGWG].
Id. art. 1.3.
Id.
OPEN-ENDED INTERGOVERNMENTAL WORKING GROUP, LEGALLY BINDING INSTRUMENT TO
REGULATE, IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, THE ACTIVITIES OF TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND
OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES EXPLANATORY NOTES ¶ 6 (2020), https://perma.cc/AZK4-3NSD.
OEIGWG, supra note 52, art. 3.
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liberty, free movement, and association.57 Moreover, the TCLT guarantees victims
the right to access effective legal aid. States must ensure that cost barriers for
victims bringing a claim are not prohibitive and that the courts do not use the
doctrine of forum non conveniens to dismiss relevant claims.58
In addition to ensuring fair access to the judicial system, the TCLT delineates
broader adjudicative jurisdiction for domestic courts. This addresses concerns
involving enforcement limitations on transnational business activities occurring in
foreign nations. This expansion opens the door for domestic courts to adjudicate
some foreign business activities carried out by domiciled corporations. Under this
treaty, jurisdiction to hear claims will vest in the courts of the states where: (1) the
human rights abuses occurred; (2) an act or omission contributing to the abuses
occurred; or (3) the domiciliary of the legal or natural person alleged to have
contributed or caused the human rights abuse in the context of business activities
is located.59
The jurisdiction provision raises one of the most important lines of analysis
for the treaty. Victims can circumvent foreign judicial systems in regions where
human rights abuses are prevalent and bring claims in the transnational
corporation’s domicile.60 Overall, the TCLT places an affirmative obligation on
states to carve out legal protection for human rights victims in the context of
transnational business activities. The corporate responsibility to respect human
rights looks more like a corporate duty, with external consequences for
noncompliance. In contrast to the UNHRC and ILO’s national-level approach to
protecting human rights, the TCLT directly regulates the relationship between
corporations and victims of human rights violations.
Hurdles to the treaty’s effectiveness still exist. States may not want to adopt
a treaty that involves adjudicating claims occurring in a different nation, citing
scarcity of domestic judicial resources or evidentiary issues. States may also exhibit
bias against foreign victims bringing suit in domestic courts, and an economic
incentive to protect a state’s domiciled corporations from suits originating outside
its borders may minimize judgements in favor of the victims. To align these
sovereign interests and overcome any hurdles, signatories must police each other
during the treaty’s implementation and operation. As international law advances
57

Id.

58

Id. For more information on the doctrine of forum non conveniens, see Jeffrey E. Baldwin, International
Human Rights Plaintiffs and the Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens, 40 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 749, 754–56
(2007).
OEIGWG, supra note 52, art. 9.
It is important to note that the jurisdiction provision raises questions about potential strategic
gamesmanship by FIFA or other corporations. For example, FIFA could establish a subsidiary
corporation in a country that is not a signatory to this treaty and escape liability. At this point, it is
unclear whether courts would impute the subsidiary’s liability to the parent organization in light of
the obvious, evasive tactics.
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toward a new reality, an important question persists: How does FIFA fit into this
framework?

IV. T HE W ORLD C UP -R E LATE D R E LATIONSHIP BETWE E N
FIFA, Q ATAR , A ND M IGR ANT W ORKE RS
A. FIFA’s Contractual Relation ship with Qatar
Although the exact details of the agreement between FIFA and Qatar to host
the World Cup are not publicly available, the contractual, business relationship
between the two entities consists of three parts: (1) the tournament bidding and
selection process; (2) the stadium agreements between FIFA and Qatar; and (3)
the government guarantees granted to FIFA. Furthermore, the implementation of
the hosting agreement in prior World Cups helps illustrate commonalities in
FIFA’s involvement with the tournament.
At the beginning of the tournament bidding process, each nation submits a
formal bid to FIFA to receive the coveted hosting rights. At this stage, FIFA
evaluates the feasibility of hosting the World Cup in that country before making
a final selection.61 This selection results in a legally binding contract between FIFA
and the winning bidder.62 In the present case, FIFA has worked with Qatar’s Local
Organising Committee (LOC) and the Supreme Committee for Delivery & Legacy
(SC) to execute the agreements between host cities and private authorities for
tournament-related infrastructure.63 In order to host the World Cup, FIFA
requires the host nation to satisfy substantial hosting prerequisites.64 For example,
for the 2014 World Cup in Brazil, FIFA received eleven guarantees from the
Brazilian government in order for Brazil to host the World Cup. Brazil codified
these guarantees into law as the Lei Geral da Copa, meaning World Cup Law, and
provided legal protections and benefits to FIFA and its corporate partners during
the World Cup.65 The guarantees included tax exemptions for FIFA and its
61

See FIFA, FIFA REGULATIONS FOR THE SELECTION OF THE VENUE FOR THE FINAL COMPETITION
OF THE 2026 FIFA WORLD CUP 26–41, https://perma.cc/43ZR-HF9E. See also Abby M.
Henderson, Comment, Mega Sporting Events Procedures and Human Rights: Developing an Inclusive
Framework, 41 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 367, 370 (2017) (pointing out that the bidding process for the
World Cup is much less methodical and formal compared to the International Olympic
Committee’s process).

62

See JOHN RUGGIE, “FOR THE GAME AND FOR THE WORLD.” FIFA & HUMAN RIGHTS 18 (2016),
https://perma.cc/N9FU-FW2Q.
See id. at 18 (2016). See also Supreme Committee for Delivery & Legacy, FIFA, https://perma.cc/Y77SC7P5 (stating that the Supreme Committee for Delivery and Legacy (SC) will be responsible for
ensuring the delivery of essential tournament infrastructure and service for the World Cup).
See FIFA, supra note 3, at 3 (noting that the evaluation report assesses the extent to which the
country has or will meet FIFA’s World Cup hosting requirements).
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Lei. No. 12.633, de 5 de junho de 2012, Diário Oficial da União [D.O.U.] de 6.6.2012 (Braz.).
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partners, Brazil’s assumption of civil liability ahead of FIFA for damages related
to the event, and an assurance that Brazil would be able to establish special
adjudicatory courts for World Cup-related matters.66
FIFA’s demands in Qatar’s case are no different. Before Qatar could host
the World Cup, the country needed to construct nine stadiums and improve three
existing ones; this is in addition to the accompanying transportation and
hospitality infrastructure needed to support the influx of fans from around the
world.67 The awarding of the World Cup to Qatar was contractually predicated on
Qatar meeting the requisite hosting demands.68 By itself, the pressure to host the
mega-event and meet FIFA’s demands can create adverse incentives to cut
corners.69 This pressure, in return, increases the risk of human rights violations in
these projects.
Moreover, FIFA and the LOC enter into stadium agreements for each
stadium. These agreements lay out the specific contractual relationship between
FIFA and the stadium authorities.70 For stadiums requiring full development or
improvements, FIFA retains the right to monitor the operation’s progress and has
the final say on the completion of the project for World Cup purposes. 71 These
stadium agreements must also meet strict and ambitious technical requirements
for seating capacity and spacing.72 Not only does FIFA have strict requirements

66

See Sarah Longhofer, Note, Contracting Away Sovereignty: The Case of Brazil, FIFA, and the Agreement for
the Right to Host the 2014 World Cup, 23 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 147, 155–59 (2014)
(emphasizing that, collectively, these laws have “put Brazil in the position of having, by agreement,
giving away its rights as a sovereign”). These laws are clear evidence of FIFA’s ability to generate
favorable conditions in exchange for World Cup rights. Interestingly, FIFA was able to secure these
guarantees even though Brazil was the only nation to submit a formal bid. This result appears to be
completely at odds with the notion that the parties would have had equal bargaining power during
the selection process. Id. at 156.

67

See FIFA, supra note 3, at 13–14. See also Qatar Spending $500m a Week on World Cup Infrastructure
Projects, BBC (Feb. 8, 2017), https://perma.cc/REN4-626J (“More than $200,000,000,000
(£160,000,000,000) will be spent in total by the gas-rich emirate.”).
See Azadeh Erfani, Comment, Kicking Away Responsibility: FIFA’s Role in Response to Migrant Worker
Abuses in Qatar’s 2022 World Cup, 22 JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS L.J. 623, 632–33 (2015) (“The
pressure to create the infrastructure of the magnitude of the World Cup is costly across the board.”).
See Henderson, supra note 61, at 368.
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69
70
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72

See, e.g., STADIUM AGREEMENT COVER BETWEEN FIFA, LOC, AND STADIUM AUTHORITY (2021),
https://perma.cc/U63K-PYUY.
See id. at 10–11.
See id. at 17, 25–26 (requiring forty-thousand capacity stadiums for the group stage and subsequent
rounds, sixty thousand capacity stadiums for the semi-final matches, and eighty thousand for the
opening and final match). See also FIFA, INSPECTION REPORT FOR THE 2014 FIFA WORLD CUP 38
(Oct. 30, 2007) (estimating that one billion dollars would be required to complete the necessary
stadium developments for the tournament).
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for these venues, it also exerts considerable pressure on the host country to satisfy
its contractual demands.73
These stadium requirements make sense. Host nations see a massive influx
of tourists from all over the world to watch the World Cup. Ensuring that the
venues are up to par for the tournament is understandable. Yet, an issue arises
when FIFA—as a controlling party to these agreements—fails to ensure the work
on these developments meets adequate labor standards and instead shifts the
blame for these violations onto the host nation. FIFA cannot take a vested,
controlling interest in the stadium developments and, simultaneously, evade any
responsibility for persistent labor and human rights violations occurring at these
sites.
One likely consequence of requiring higher labor standards for host nations
such as Qatar is the increased cost of monitoring and compliance. It is unclear
whether these expense increases for host nations would make future World Cups
cost prohibitive for certain countries. For Qatar, this almost certainly is not the
case. With the nation spending almost $500 million each week on World Cup
infrastructure projects, it is difficult to argue that increases in labor compliance
and monitoring costs would inflict financial hardship relative to its current
expenditures.74 Even for countries incapable of bearing these increased costs in
exchange for hosting the World Cup, the prohibitive effect of this tradeoff is
arguably a normatively desirable outcome. Should a country that cannot
implement higher labor standards and compliance mechanisms due to concerns
over cost even undertake the already-costly process of hosting a World Cup? The
nation’s time and resources may provide greater, long-term benefits to the country
if applied to something other than a soccer tournament.
Finally, Qatar’s exchange with FIFA of favorable government guarantees for
hosting rights, akin to that between FIFA and Brazil, suspiciously resembles a quid
pro quo.75 FIFA has pushed for considerable legal exemptions and guarantees for
it and its corporate partners during the 2022 World Cup. This includes commercial
exclusivity zones around the stadium, substantial tax breaks, and absolute control
over ticket pricing and sales.76 For example, Qatar has already guaranteed a
corporate tax exemption for FIFA and its corporate partners during the

73

74
75

76

See Longhofer, supra note 66, at 163 (noting that tensions arose between FIFA and Brazil over the
pace of construction for World Cup infrastructure).
BBC, supra note 67.
See Ian Pollock, World Cup: To Tax or Not to Tax?, BBC (May 11, 2010), https://perma.cc/T8Q7SJVQ (suggesting that a successful bid is predicated on tax exemptions for FFIA and its partners).
See Longhofer, supra note 66, at 160, 163–66 (“[T]he hosting agreement has the effect of changing
Brazil’s relationship with its own laws.”).
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implementation of the World Cup and related activities. 77 Therefore, the stadiums
serve as an important point of control and revenue driver for the event. From the
awarding of the tournament to the final match, FIFA takes a hands-on approach
to the World Cup; Qatar 2022 is no exception.

B. Migrant Workers, the World Cup, and Who’s to Blame?
Due to Qatar’s small labor force, the nation has relied on migrant workers
to construct the requisite infrastructure for the World Cup.78 Unfortunately,
Qatar’s grossly inadequate labor standards and exploitative employee sponsorship
system has perpetuated human rights violations against these laborers.
Prior to recent reform efforts, Qatar’s Kafala system severely restricted the
mobility of workers through employee work sponsorship.79 The sponsorship
system aided in the perpetuation of human rights abuses, such as forced labor,
unpaid or delayed wages, inhumane working conditions, and prohibitively
expensive recruitment fees that inevitably led to unpayable debts.80 Although the
system has undergone significant changes in the last two years in response to
serious international pressure, reform efforts have failed to eliminate the risk of
migrant worker abuses and rectify past abuses.81 While these labor abuses are
largely prohibited under Qatari law, the sponsorship and judicial systems do not
afford adequate protection and remedies for these violations.82 This is primarily
because a lack of enforcement fosters poor labor accountability, and the current
labor system provides little incentive for Qatari nationals, the beneficiaries of this
labor, to advocate for reform.83
In reality, Qatar only modified exiting labor laws due to pressure from the
ILO.84 The ILO focused on reforming five labor issues in Qatar: (1) minimum
77

See Qatar: Concessionary Statement of Practice for Specific Entities Involved in FIFA Competitions, PWC (Dec.
30, 2019), https://perma.cc/D4PJ-4Y83.

78

See Erfani, supra note 68, at 22 (“Qatar will rely on the labor of approximately one million foreign
laborers to build the stadiums and infrastructure necessary to hold the World Cup.”).
See Renkiewicz, supra note 8, at 728–30.
See HUM. RTS. WATCH, “HOW CAN WE WORK WITHOUT WAGES?,” 38–45 (2020),
https://perma.cc/G2XY-UYL9; Pete Pattison, Revealed: Qatar’s World Cup ‘Slaves’, GUARDIAN
(Sept. 25, 2013, 12:46 AM), https://perma.cc/AUA3-M5KY.
See Qatar: Reform Efforts Fail to Remedy Rights Abuses, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Jan. 14, 2020). But see Press
Release, ILO, Dismantling the Kafala System and Introducing a Minimum Wage Mark New Era
for Qatar Labour Market (Aug. 30, 2020), https://perma.cc/W34L-BDYR.
See Erfani, supra note 68, at 635–36.
See id.
See ILO, Complaint Concerning Non-Observance of the Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No.
29), and the Labour Inspection Convention, 1947 (No. 81) 1–3, ILO Doc. GB.331/INS/13(Rev.)
(Oct. 31, 2017); Press Release, ILO, ILO Governing Body Welcomes Qatar’s Commitment to
Bolster Migrant Workers Rights (Nov. 8, 2017), https://perma.cc/B4YN-J5EH.
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wage, (2) the Kafala system, (3) forced labor, (4) labor inspections, and (5) access
to justice.85 For example, Qatar eliminated the exit visa requirement and the No
Objection Certificate—a certificate granted by the employer and required before
a worker could switch jobs before the end of the employment contract.86 Even
though issues with implementation and enforcement have plagued the
effectiveness of these reforms, these labor changes suggest that external pressure
can be a driver of reform in Qatar. This point is especially relevant when the
external actor maintains significant economic leverage and political bargaining
power over Qatar.
Despite, Qatar still does not allow non-nationals to form labor unions, a
fundamental worker’s right under the ILO Freedom of Association and
Protection of the Right to Organise Convention.87 Qatar’s unionization-related
reservation to this Convention reveals existing tension between the ILO’s
objectives and Qatar’s desire to maintain some control over its labor force. This
restriction is especially damaging in a nation where migrant workers struggle to
access effective remedies through the domestic court system. Without avenues for
redress or unionization, laborers are in a distinctly disadvantageous position when
faced with violations of their rights. Thus, human rights abuses in Qatar have gone
unchecked due to a lack of necessary internal and external safeguards.88
The current international legal framework has completely shielded FIFA
from any liability in connection with both migrant worker abuses in Qatar and the
World Cup. FIFA initially emphasized that it believed the monitoring and
prevention of human rights violations should be left to Qatar. 89 This refusal to
take responsibility is quite bold given the nexus between FIFA’s substantial
involvement in the implementation of the World Cup and the ensuing human
rights abuses in Qatar. In recent years, FIFA has taken proactive steps toward
accepting its role and responsibility to prevent human rights abuses within the
context of its business activities. These steps include recognizing the GPs in 2015,
issuing a statement in 2015 that it would require a commissioned, independent
study on human rights risk by the bidding country in its formal bid for future
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See Overview of Qatar’s Achievements Supported by the ILO, ILO, https://perma.cc/4KE4-MYH2.
See Press Release, ILO, ILO Governing Body Welcomes Qatar’s Commitment to Bolster Migrant
Workers Rights (Nov. 8, 2017), https://perma.cc/B4YN-J5EH.
ILO, Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention art. 2, Doc.
CO/87 (July 9, 1948); REALITY CHECK, supra note 7 (pointing out that when Qatar ratified two
important human rights treaties, it entered a reservation disallowing migrant workers to unionize).
For an extensive investigation into migrant worker abuses on Qatar World Cup projects, see
Pattisson, supra note 80.
See Erfani, supra note 68 (stressing that FIFA initially did not acknowledge any responsibility for the
abuses in Qatar).
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World Cups, and adopting human rights clauses in its governing statutes in 2016.90
In response to criticism over Qatar’s labor and human rights track record, FIFA
established the Human Rights Advisory Board (Board) to provide
recommendations to FIFA for addressing human rights issues. In a recent report,
the Board acknowledged FIFA’s responsibility for the human rights impacts in
Qatar and provided recommendations to FIFA for minimizing negative effects
on workers, including for the 2022 World Cup.91 These recommendations
included the “creation of a shared set of labor standards across all construction
projects in [Qatar]” and support for a “discussion involving all the key actors in
the construction sector in Qatar.”92 Yet, both recommendations lack any
meaningful substance.
Even if FIFA had convinced Qatar to establish uniform labor standards
across all construction projects, consistent failures to fully enforce labor standards
would have left workers in the same helpless position. For example, a recent audit
by the Supreme Committee (SC) demonstrated “ongoing compliance issues
among contractors” related to working and living conditions of contracted
workers.93 Moreover, an investigative report by Amnesty International in June
2020 detailed around 100 instances of migrant workers on World Cup stadium
projects not receiving wages for up to seven months. 94 In this instance, FIFA
claims it was not aware of these violations until Amnesty International brought it
to the SC’s attention, showing a disconnect between FIFA’s policy statements and
actions.95 FIFA’s internal recommendations to support conversations about
worker reform in Qatar appear superficial, as evidenced by the continual flow of
reports surrounding labor violations connected to the World Cup.
Although these oversight mechanisms signal a positive change, it is unclear
whether this ex ante approach is sufficient to address the totality of risks associated
with these mega-events. When awarding the World Cup, FIFA’s disproportionate
bargaining power and immense influence place it in a position to both prevent
human rights abuses and face liability for a failure to do so. On the surface, FIFA
masquerades as a pioneer for human rights protections and reform in Qatar;
90
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94
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See RUGGIE, supra note 62, at 17; ERGON, INDEPENDENT REPORT: HUMAN RIGHTS IN CANADA,
MEXICO, AND THE USA IN THE CONTEXT OF A POTENTIAL FIFA 2026 WORLD CUP COMPETITION
2 (2018), https://perma.cc/C2XK-SJS8.
See FIFA HUM. RTS. ADVISORY BD., THIRD REPORT BY THE FIFA HUMAN RIGHTS ADVISORY
BOARD 9–10 (2019), https://perma.cc/944E-5F8E (“The strategy represents the first time that
FIFA has clearly articulated its responsibility in connection with impacts that are linked to the
construction and operation of FWC stadia and facilities.”).
Id. at 10.
AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 12, at 27 (2020).
“I Have Worked Hard – I Deserve to be Paid” Exploitation on Qatar World Cup Stadium, AMNESTY INT’L
(June 10, 2020), https://perma.cc/922K-YFUT.
See AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 12, at 29.
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however, no one can hold the organization liable under current international law
and it enjoys protection from any claims arising from its own business activities.
FIFA’s human rights track record for the World Cup does not align with its
published human rights policies, the same policies that invoke fundamental,
international human rights treaties.96 To deter absolute hypocrisy, “any
organization that willingly commits itself to human rights and claims to operate
within the international legal framework must be held fully accountable by the
states within which it operates.”97

V. FIFA AS THE B E ST P ROBLE M S OLVE R
This Section argues that, due to FIFA’s powerful bargaining position when
deciding to award a World Cup, the organization has a unique duty to mitigate
and prevent human rights abuses arising out of its business activities in connection
with the tournament. Yet, without adequate incentives to alter FIFA’s behavior,
the organization’s positional advantage remains unused.

A. FIFA’s Positional Advantage
Each of the aforementioned elements places FIFA in a uniquely powerful
position to prevent and rectify the adverse human rights impacts associated with
its operations. The organization’s consistent failure to do so suggests a stronger
liability regime is necessary to incentivize more effective safeguards and achieve
actual accountability through victim redress.
The World Cup infrastructure developments often entail labor-intensive
projects that carry a substantial risk for human rights violations within FIFA’s
network of contractors and subcontractors.98 These risks are often exacerbated by
pressures to finish the projects on time.99 Without the stadiums, for example, there
can be no World Cup. It is no surprise that host countries fail to adequately protect
human rights during these periods, especially considering that these negative
effects “disproportionately impact minority, impoverished, and indigenous
populations.”100 As a repeat player, FIFA should possess a deep understanding of
certain recurring human rights risks inherent in a World Cup bid, primarily labor
rights implicated in large-scale World Cup infrastructure projects, and foresee the

99

See Haley Ferguson, Sporting Institutions Turned a Blind Eye to China’s Human Rights Abuses, But They
Have Potential to Drive Global Change, 24 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 109, 111 (2020).
Id.
See RUGGIE, supra note 62, at 22–23.
See id. at 22.
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Henderson, supra note 61, at 368.
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likelihood that its actions will contribute to these abuses.101 When a complete
World Cup bid is contingent on new stadium developments or improvements, a
consistent theme in the 2010, 2014, and 2018 World Cups, labor rights inevitably
come into play. If used appropriately, FIFA’s expertise and insights can prove
valuable in reducing or eliminating these social costs. Evidence of social costs,
however, are often overshadowed by the purported benefits of hosting the World
Cup. In many ways, the perceived benefits of the World Cup mask the inevitable
social costs associated with this mega-event.
Even so, short and long-term economic benefits from hosting a World Cup
are debatable. Nations incur heavy expenditures when putting on the tournament.
But why? Bidding countries tout the creation of jobs and a sharp increase in output
to arouse public support for their bids.102 These claims, typically bolstered by a
commissioned ex ante consulting report, run contrary to ex post economic studies
finding that, in most cases, there is “no statistically significant effect on
employment or income” stemming from a World Cup.103 Even more troubling is
the idea that countries will incur significant opportunity costs by spending money
on stadiums that could go to other, more pressing infrastructure needs. 104 In the
long-term, however, host countries may stand to benefit from the “positive
residue of . . . a handful of constructive infrastructure investments,” potential
positive psychological effects on citizens of the host country, and improved
international perception.105 Regardless, the exact reasons countries use to justify
hosting a tournament only matter to a certain extent. Countries still line up to
submit bids for future tournaments, and FIFA gladly welcomes this competition.
Due, in part, to the perceived tangible and intangible short-term and longterm economic benefits derived from hosting the tournament, countries often
engage in a race to the bottom, competing to offer increasingly favorable terms in
order to influence FIFA’s selection.106 This relationship stands to benefit FIFA
because it owns a monopoly on the hosting rights. Many bids include favorable
commercial exclusivity deals for FIFA and its partners; in advance of the 2010
World Cup, for example, FIFA required Brazil to alter its laws to allow alcohol
consumption in stadiums for the World Cup in order to benefit FIFA’s corporate
101

See id. at 401 (discussing how FIFA should have foreseen the infrastructure developments in
Brazil—a country that is no stranger to political corruption—would give rise to human rights
violations for workers).
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Id. at 40–43.
See id. at 73–74. It is important to note that countries with pre-existing stadium infrastructure will
likely not bear the same degree of long-term costs associated with these projects.
Id. at 57–58, 69.
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partners who were supplying alcohol at the event.107 The considerable influence
of the organization on host countries cannot be ignored. FIFA can clearly take
proactive steps to utilize its unique leverage to aggressively bargain for more
favorable human rights protections as it relates to the World Cup.108
As history shows, however, FIFA has largely used its influence to secure
profitable deals for itself and to offload any tournament liability risk. Admittedly,
FIFA has taken concrete steps to implement procedural safeguards and has
acknowledged its responsibility in preventing human rights abuses.109 The
organization officially adopted the GPs and added a human rights assessment to
its bidding criteria. FIFA’s adoption of the GPs represents the organization’s
recognition of its role in human rights but has not aided the organization’s
transition from recognition to action, with reports of unpaid wages, forced labor,
and extortionary recruitment fees still arising out of Qatar in the last year.110 While
these steps signal a positive change within the organization, these internal
mechanisms may require additional support from external pressures to create
effective internal change.111 A greater threat of external liability for FIFA due to
the organization’s failure to protect human rights within its activities may lead
FIFA to include contractual terms that better respect human rights or to leverage
its position with LOCs to induce the host government to fulfill its obligation to
respect human rights.112 In this way, external liability can serve as a natural
incentive for FIFA to restructure its World Cup activities to minimize adverse
human rights impacts.
This positional advantage warrants consideration when applied more
broadly to corporations investing in projects in foreign nations. At the outset, a
firm that wishes to invest substantial capital into a foreign market likely has
multiple options. Therefore, attractive benefits of increased economic investment
open the door for negotiations over human rights protections and guarantees
between the firm and sovereign. Different localities can function as a competitive
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See Lei. No. 12.633 art. 3–10, de 5 de Junho de 2012, Diário Oficial da União [D.O.U.] de 6.6.2012
(Braz.); Henderson, supra note 61, at 403.
FIFA certainly can bargain for broader guarantees beyond the scope of the World Cup. This idea,
however, is outside of the scope of this Comment but should not be ignored.
It is important to note that FIFA’s ability to assess these risks is entirely undermined in a corrupted
bidding process. The lack of financial integrity at the outset can influence operational risks at later
stages. See RUGGIE, supra note 62, at 21.
See HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 80, at 34–45.
See Bruce W. Bean, The Perfect Crime? FIFA and the Absence of Accountability in Switzerland, 32 MD. J.
INT’L L. 68, 124–25 (2017) (questioning whether internal mechanisms for enacting change can be
effective in an organization with a “culture or equilibrium of corruption [that] pervades the entire
FIFA ecosystem”).
See RUGGIE, supra note 62, at 32–33.
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market; sovereigns may guarantee these protections to not lose out on a valuable
investment opportunity for its economy.

B. The Current Absence of Accountability Back Home
Because FIFA is incorporated in Switzerland, the association is subject to
Swiss laws and the Swiss judicial system. Swiss law offers little regulatory oversight
for FIFA and has allowed FIFA to enjoy a “century of corruption” under the
“unique, protective culture of Swiss hospitality to sports crime.”113 Moreover,
Switzerland is hesitant to take any concrete actions against FIFA due to the
“economic significance” international sports organizations have within the
country’s economy.114 Thus, the lack of accountability has affected FIFA’s
approach to the World Cup. Because FIFA’s stakeholders, such as fans, teams,
and sponsors, have yet to effectively apply pressure on the organization to reform,
FIFA conforms only to the wishes of its own directors.115 The decades of
organizational corruption and scandals without meaningful reform bolster this
proposition.116
External accountability has not successfully influenced FIFA’s actions. This
insulation illuminates a particularly troubling aspect of FIFA’s role as a
“supra-national institution.”117 It can impose its will on other sovereigns without
significant pushback for its own actions. Without strong governmental
accountability, the public at large must rely on FIFA’s goodwill implemented
through its own internal corporate governance to avoid, prevent, and remedy the
negative effects of its decisions. But without the consistent threat of external
accountability, FIFA has not shown a willingness to enact organizational change
on its own. Although FIFA’s responsibility to address human rights issues “exists
independently”118 from the Swiss government’s willingness to uphold its own
“primary obligation to respect, protect, and fulfill human rights,” a supervening
international treaty may break the mutually beneficial stalemate and spur action
on both sides.119
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Bean, supra note 111, at 80. For more information on Switzerland’s “implicit complicity,” see id. at
120.
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Switzerland is home to at least sixty-five international sporting associations that contribute, in
aggregate, over one billion dollars to the economy. See id. at 120.
See id. at 84 (noting that FIFA is not accountable to its stakeholders because “there is no obvious
means of doing so”).
See id. at 107.
Id. at 108–09.
RUGGIE, supra note 62, at 36.
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VI. A N E W A VE NU E F OR A CC OU NTABILITY
Because FIFA falls under the purview of the TCLT created via Resolution
26/9, it is liable for failing to adequately fulfill its duty. Without the threat of actual
liability, FIFA does not have any incentive to ensure that these abuses do not
persist. Its contractual relationship with host countries has kept the organization’s
foreign business activities away from the extraterritorial reach of Swiss courts,
assuming Swiss courts possess the desire to exercise jurisdiction in the first place,
which appears unlikely given Switzerland’s history of complicity with FIFA’s
internal corruption.120 The organization’s unsatisfying track record involving
human rights issues and subsequent lack of actual organizational change or
accountability is especially problematic when viewed in light of three elements: (1)
the foreseeability of human rights risks invariably associated with mega sporting
events;121 (2) FIFA’s ability to leverage hosting rights for temporary legal
exceptionalism;122 and (3) FIFA’s organizational mission and values.123

A. Transitioning to Hard Law
Ascertaining FIFA’s liability under the TCLT requires examining whether
FIFA’s actions fall within the scope of the treaty. First, it is important to note that
the transition from a “soft law” regime that invokes general principles and
declarations to a “hard law” regime imposes greater obligations upon the state to
enforce its commitments, including by enacting direct legal changes within its
national jurisdiction.124 Hard law effectiveness results from external pressure for
organizations to act within the confines of the law. Admittedly, the advancement
of a hard law system for governing corporations can create substantial costs:
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See PRAKKEN D’OLIVEIRA, FNV & NADIM SHARIFUL ALAM VERSUS FIFA: CASE SUMMARY 1–9
(Oct. 3, 2016), https://perma.cc/4KY6-KURW (alleging that FIFA acted wrongfully by selecting
Qatar to host the World Cup but not taking action to assure workers’ rights would be protected);
Press Release, FIFA, Swiss Court Rejects Labour Union’s Claim Against FIFA Concerning Qatar
2022 (Jan. 6, 2017), https://perma.cc/8AJU-3X6H.
See MAURICE ROCHE, MEGAEVENTS AND MODERNITY: OLYMPICS AND EXPOS IN THE GROWTH OF
GLOBAL CULTURE 1 (2000) (“‘Mega-events’ are large-scale cultural (including commercial and
sporting) events which have a dramatic character, mass popular appeal and international
significance.”); RUGGIE, supra note 62, at 20 (stressing that major international sporting events
“invariably pose human rights risks”).
See Longhofer, supra note 66, at 166; Megan Corrarino, Note, “Law Exclusion Zones”: Mega-Events as
Sites of Procedural and Substantive Human Rights Violations, 17 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 180, 182–
86 (2017).
Compare FIFA, FIFA’S HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY 8–9 (2017), https://perma.cc/KXV8-FRFL, with
Bandeira, supra note 2, at 427–35 (2017) (documenting the contrast between FIFA’s organizational
values and the actual adverse human rights impacts in relation to each World Cup since 2010).
Gregory C. Shaffer & Mark A. Pollack, Hard vs. Soft Law: Alternatives, Complements, and Antagonists in
International Governance, 94 MINN. L. REV. 706, 717–18 (2010).
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It can create formal commitments that restrict the behavior of states,
infringing on national sovereignty in potentially sensitive areas. . . .
Additionally, hard-law agreements can be more difficult to adapt to changing
circumstances. Hard law is particularly problematic, socio-legal scholars
contend, where it presupposes a fixed condition when situations of
uncertainty demand constant experimentation and adjustment, where it
requires uniformity when a tolerance of national diversity is needed, and
where it is difficult to change when frequent change may be essential. 125

But context is crucial to this assessment. The current soft law regime for corporate
accountability on the international stage, primarily the GPs, provides a foundation
upon which hard law is developing.126 For example, the TCLT’s expansion of
court jurisdiction over business activities and relationships occurring in foreign
nations naturally follows from the state’s primary duty to protect human rights
embedded in the GPs. FIFA’s unique position under current Swiss law
necessitates reevaluation as to whether a soft law regime is the most effective
means of regulating FIFA’s activities.127 Therefore, even though FIFA has
adopted the GPs and established an Ethics Committee to review internal
processes, liability under a hard law instrument can provide an effective
enforcement mechanism for FIFA’s future actions.

B. Mapping FIFA’s Liability under Resolution 26/9 and the
Proposed Legally Binding Instrument
A major concern under the current framework is that FIFA has successfully
skirted any responsibility under the soft law regime for respecting human rights
by blame-shifting and turning a blind eye. However, the proposed TCLT,
mandated by Council Resolution 26/9, offers a new avenue for holding FIFA
liable for human rights abuses in Qatar connected to the 2022 World Cup. This
treaty promises accountability for the current tournament and will likely ensure
future tournaments do not perpetuate the same abuses prevalent in the previous
four World Cups. But to achieve accountability for FIFA under this hard law
regime, FIFA’s actions must fall under the purview of the treaty.

1. The World Cup as a Transnational Business Activity
Concerned with attaching liability to a wide swath of corporate activities, the
scope of the TCLT applies to all “business enterprises . . . that undertake business

125
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Id. at 718–19.
See id. at 722–23. See also Miño, supra note 49, at 2 (“[T]he Guiding Principles on Business and
Human Rights and the new treaty could and should be mutually reinforcing and complementary.”).
See RUGGIE, supra note 62, at 36 (emphasizing that the organization’s unchecked, “self-regulation”
in Switzerland no longer exists).
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activities of a transnational character.”128 Even though FIFA is incorporated as an
association under Swiss law, the organization carries out its business activities
through a vast global network of contractual relationships.129 The size and scope
of these activities support the notion that FIFA is operating like a business
enterprise. Furthermore, the activities conducted in connection with the World
Cup, including brand licensing, procurement, and ticket sales support the
conclusion that FIFA also operates as a business enterprise within the TCLT’s
scope. Moreover, the mega-event’s broad commercialization and advertising
appeal have allowed FIFA to profit considerably from the tournament. For
example, in 2018, FIFA secured $1.8 billion in net revenue, driven in part by
licensing, broadcasting, and marketing revenues from the 2018 World Cup in
Russia.130 The tournament consistently nets FIFA a substantial profit.131
In order for the World Cup to qualify as a transnational business activity, the
event must occur in one state but include substantial “preparation, planning,
direction, [and] control” in another state.132 This requirement is clearly satisfied as
FIFA is headquartered in Switzerland yet maintains significant control and
involvement in its business relationships with the LOC and host government.133
Additionally, the TCLT protects all internationally recognized human rights in the
UDHR and fundamental ILO Conventions and Protocols that arise during
transnational business activities.134 The labor abuses connected to the World Cup
in Qatar, such as unpaid wages and inhumane working conditions, undoubtedly
fall within the TCLT’s scope, and, in turn, implicate FIFA as a principal actor.
Characterizing FIFA’s actions as transnational business activities under this treaty,
however, means little without an understanding of the mechanisms for imposing
liability ex post.

2. Examining Jurisdiction
Under Article VIII of the TCLT, states must provide an effective system of
legal liability for legal or natural persons causing or contributing to human rights
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OEIGWG, supra note 52, art. 3. FIFA’s decision to embed the Guiding Principles into its statutes
further supports the claim that FIFA operates as a business enterprise.
See RUGGIE, supra note 62, at 16.
FIFA, FINANCIAL REPORT 2018 70 (2018), https://perma.cc/GJ95-NLJ3 [hereinafter FINANCIAL
REPORT].
Some have argued that FIFA’s heavy spending on the World Cup in relation to actual development
projects shows how the organization is more focused on making a profit and operating like a
business. See Bandeira, supra note 2, at 436–42.
OEIGWG, supra note 52, art. 1.4.
See id. (defining business relationship to include activities conducted through subsidiaries, suppliers,
agents, or any other contractual relationship to conduct business activities).
See id. art 3.
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abuses in their business activities or business relationships. 135 This system must
include legal liability for transnational business activities conducted by legal
persons domiciled in that state.136 Because FIFA is incorporated in Switzerland,
the organization is considered domiciled in that state.137 Therefore, this treaty will
require Switzerland to provide a system of liability for FIFA’s activities or
relationships occurring outside of its borders. The possibility exists that
Switzerland may decide to not ratify the final treaty and, thus, absolve itself of any
obligation to establish this system of liability. This action appears unlikely given
Switzerland’s continued involvement in each drafting and negotiating session held
by the OEIGWG, while countries such as the United States not participated in
these sessions.138 Even if Switzerland does decide not to ratify the treaty, Article
IX vests courts with jurisdiction to hear claims against non-domiciled legal or
natural persons when “no other effective forum guaranteeing a fair trial is
available.”139 Thus, although the clearest route to victim remedy is contingent on
Switzerland’s ratification, alternative means of adjudicative jurisdiction do exist.

3. Connecting FIFA’s Involvement in the World Cup to the Human
Rights Violations in Qatar
With FIFA’s actions constituting transnational business activities and there
being a clear case for Switzerland’s jurisdiction over FIFA, the remaining
consideration is whether there is a sufficient nexus between FIFA’s actions and
the human rights abuses in Qatar. Article VIII liability for human rights abuses
linked to the World Cup can be established through FIFA’s business activities and
relationships in Qatar. If the implementation of the World Cup constitutes a single
transnational business activity, FIFA’s involvement during the lead-up to the
tournament through contractual relationships with the LOC is a sufficient
connection for liability.140 Assuming the relevant business activity is constrained
to the development of the World Cup infrastructure—a primary driver behind the
substantial human rights violations—FIFA’s stadium agreements with the LOC
and host cities, public authorities, and private entities responsible for the

136

See OEIGWG, supra note 52, art. 8.
See id. art. 8.
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See id. art. 9.
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See Emilio Rafael Izquierdo Miño (Chair-Rapporteur), Report on the Sixth Session of the Open-Ended
Intergovernmental Working Group on Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Respect to
Human Rights 11, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/46/73 (Jan. 14, 2021) (listing the nations that participated in
the sixth session).
OEIGWG, supra note 52, art. 9.
For an example of the contractual relationship between FIFA and the LOC, see Press Release,
FIFA, FIFA and Qatar Announce Joint Venture to Deliver 2022 FIFA World Cup (Feb. 5, 2019),
https://perma.cc/3WST-ZT9U (announcing the establishment of a joint venture, FIFA World
Cup Qatar 2022 LLC, between FIFA and Qatar).
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tournament-related stadiums establish a sufficient nexus between FIFA and the
stadium infrastructure developments.141 FIFA’s contractual requirements and
retention of oversight rights, including the organization’s exertion of pressure on
the host country to meet its timely demands, implicates FIFA in the ensuing
human rights abuses.
Yet, even if FIFA’s direct involvement in the stadium development is legally
insufficient, the scope of the TCLT also calls for liability for failure to prevent
another entity, with whom FIFA has a business relationship, from committing
human rights abuses.142 This liability, however, hinges on the foreseeability of
these abuses in the context of the business relationship.143 Surely, this
qualification—a business relationship that contains a foreseeable adverse human
rights risk—is satisfied in this case, where FIFA’s primary foreign business
relationship is with the LOC and stadium authorities. Two factors establish the
foreseeability of human rights risks associated with this project.
First, previous World Cups and other mega-events, such as the Olympics,
have produced similar negative impacts on human rights.144 In Brazil, the demand
for mega-event infrastructure before the 2014 World Cup led to the eviction of
communities across Rio de Janiero.145 These displacements were particularly
problematic given the urban housing deficit for poor individuals, the relaxation of
due process for mass evictions, and the fear that the World Cup facilitated the
mass evictions of low-income communities.146 Yet, the pressure to finish
labor-intensive projects and follow through with specified government guarantees
created the same perverse incentives to complete the project at all cost.147 Even in
the wake of a World Cup construction death in Brazil, FIFA threatened to strip
hosting status from a city if it did not adequately progress on the stadium
development.148
Second, assuming FIFA did not foresee the harms it contributed to in prior
tournaments, the circumstances surrounding the World Cup in Qatar alone
necessitate a conclusion of foreseeability. At the outset, Qatar received the bid
141
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See RUGGIE, supra note 62, at 18, 22–23 (“FIFA and the LOC can be linked to such human rights
risks and abuses through their networks of contracts and subcontracts for the delivery of projects.”).
For a comprehensive look at a stadium contract, see generally, STADIUM AGREEMENT COVER, supra
note 70.
See OEIGWG, supra note 52, art. 8.6.
See id.
See Henderson, supra note 61, at 401.
See Corrarino, supra note 122, at 195–97.
See id.
See Dantam Le, Leveraging the ILO for Human Rights and Workers' Rights in International Sporting Events,
42 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 171, 187–88 (2020).
See Shasta Darlington & Sarah Holt, ‘No Stadium, No Match’ – FIFA Issues Threat to Brazil World Cup
City, CNN (Jan. 22, 2014), https://perma.cc/72P3-6YPP.
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even though it was the only country to receive a “high” operational risk
assessment in its bid evaluation.149 Qatar’s need to construct significant
tournament infrastructure, the country’s reliance on migrant laborers to complete
these projects, the Kafala system, and inadequate labor standards perpetuated the
human rights abuses of migrant workers. The resulting labor abuses caused by a
bureaucratically-endorsed, exploitative labor system are certainly foreseeable.
Therefore, supported by differing theories, the conclusion remains the same:
FIFA’s involvement in the World Cup human rights violations falls within the
TCLT’s scope.

4. Removing Procedural Hurdles and Expanding Access to Remedies
Perhaps the most important provision of the TCLT involves the expansion
of adjudicative jurisdiction for domestic courts. Under Article IX, jurisdiction for
claims by victims shall vest in the courts where the natural or legal person
contributing to such abuses is domiciled.150 In the present case, Swiss courts will
have jurisdiction to hear claims from migrant workers who suffered human rights
violations in Qatar. Concerns about the practicality of individual migrant workers
in Qatar bringing suit in Switzerland are not pressing. Article IV of the TCLT
grants victims the right to submit claims through a representative.151 Therefore,
international human rights organizations can represent these workers in
Switzerland, if necessary. Finally, the victim’s choice of forum, if consistent with
the treaty’s other provisions, imposes obligatory jurisdiction upon the court. 152
This provision prevents a court from declining to hear the case on the grounds of
forum non conveniens.153 Under this doctrine, a Swiss court could theoretically decline
to hear a migrant worker’s case on the theory that Qatari courts would be a more
appropriate forum to adjudicate the claim.154 When a law explicitly subverts this
doctrine, as the U.S. Second Circuit Court of Appeals explained in a case applying
the Tort Victims Protection Act to foreign affairs, it “communicate[s] a policy that
such suits should not be facilely dismissed on the assumption that the ostensibly
foreign controversy is not our business.”155 The inclusion of this provision in the
TCLT can best be understood as a decision to promote domestic interests in the
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foreign controversies that domiciled, transnational corporations carry out in other
nations.
This is especially important for claims arising out of countries with
ineffective judicial systems for marginalized populations, such as Qatar. Certainly,
adverse concerns weigh against the beneficial effects of expanding judicial reach
in Switzerland. Eliminating forum non conveniens in these situations will likely lead to
greater costs on the Swiss judicial system through an increased case load.
Additionally, allowing migrant workers to seek remedy outside of Qatar could
create greater problems for gathering and collecting evidence or ensuring
institutional competence in adjudicating foreign labor claims; ultimately, this may
unfairly prejudice FIFA in its ability to defend itself in an inappropriate venue.
Although these are valid issues, the benefits of discarding forum non conveniens
are far greater. Under the current soft law framework, transnational corporations
can strategically operate in regions with exploitative labor systems at lower costs
thanks, in part, to substandard regulatory enforcement. These actions would not
be possible in their domicile. Foreclosing the doctrine’s application in these cases
will provide a safeguard for migrant workers who are effectively shut out of the
judicial system in Qatar. While bringing a claim against FIFA in Switzerland
sidesteps the national bias pervasive in Qatar, it admittedly opens the door for
Swiss bias in favor of the nation’s pre-existing status as a refuge for international
sports governing bodies.156 Greater accountability for FIFA and guaranteed
protections for migrant laborers provide a compelling justification for not
allowing forum non conveniens to hinder necessary remedies.
The TCLT also requires states to implement due diligence laws under which
businesses must conduct human rights due diligence “proportionate to their size,
risk of severe human rights impacts, and the nature and context of their
operations.”157 This is especially important in FIFA’s context because of the
organization’s global reach and the level of risk associated with mega-events.158 As
a result, FIFA’s due diligence will be substantial. This provision also ensures, at
the very minimum, FIFA’s failure to prevent human rights abuses in its business
activities and relationships cannot be undermined by foreseeability defenses. The
human rights due diligence requirement plays a necessary role in governing
corporate entities. While corporations may already commit to engaging in such
preventative, proactive measures, a liability regime involving state sanctions for
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noncompliance provides stronger incentives for corporations to actually conduct
a thorough assessment of their human rights impacts.159

5. Imposing the Penalty
A finding of liability pursuant to the TCLT can lead to two results. First,
under Article VIII, Swiss courts must provide for a system of “effective,
proportionate, and dissuasive criminal/administrative sanctions” against FIFA
when the organization contributed to or caused human rights violations.160 These
sanctions serve punitive and deterrent functions in hopes of aligning the
organization with the international community’s expectations for respecting
human rights. This provision would require Switzerland to deviate from its laissez
faire approach to governmental oversight for FIFA.161 It is uncertain the extent to
which Switzerland would seek to punish FIFA due to the country’s economically
beneficial relationship with the organization. Yet, the size and scope of the abuses
committed in Qatar may persuade the state’s courts to impose substantial financial
penalties on the organization.162 Second, in conjunction with punitive sanctions,
victims will also be able to seek reparations for abuses caused by FIFA in its
transnational business activities.163 Due to the variety and degrees of abuses
suffered in Qatar, it is unclear how the Swiss courts will navigate this area. Claims
such as unpaid wages are easier to resolve than forced labor, inhumane working
conditions, or worker death. While the exact intricacies of the TCLT’s
implementation in Switzerland are uncertain, the TCLT would provide an
expansive system focusing on both ex ante and ex post mechanisms to ensure
FIFA’s compliance. Under this regime, third parties may finally hold FIFA
accountable for its disregard of the adverse human rights impacts caused by its
business activities and relationships.

VII. I MP LIC ATIONS , C ONSIDE RATIONS , A ND
U NANSWE RE D Q U E STIONS
The implementation of the TCLT imposes heftier obligations upon both
FIFA and Switzerland. This Section addresses the potential effects of this treaty
on FIFA and explores broader implications on transnational business activities in
general.
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This due diligence report will not, however, absolve FIFA from liability. See OEIGWG, supra note
52, art. 8.
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See Bean, supra note 111, at 119–22.
See OEIGWG, supra note 52, art. 8.8 (“Regardless of the nature of the liability, States Parties shall
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Id. art. 8.4.
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A. Investment-Liability Tradeoff
The prior analysis concluded that, under the TCLT and Council Resolution
26/9, FIFA is liable for human rights abuses connected to the World Cup in
Qatar. There are two concerns, however, about a hard law regime and how it
affects investment. These concerns include that (1) the crystallization of
international obligations through a treaty may be an inappropriate method for
addressing the inherent complexities in global supply chains and networks of
contractual relationships; and that (2) increased organizational costs associated
with increasing human rights protections and increasing risk of liability may cause
transnational corporations to avoid economically beneficial ventures in
developing nations with inadequate labor standards or safeguards against abuse.
Hard law obligations will create greater costs for noncompliance. Although
this may seem like a valuable outcome, an international legal obligation fixes
corporate duties based on current circumstances. States may not possess the
flexibility to deal with factual uncertainties and evolve their understanding of how
to regulate transnational business activities.164 A concern exists that state oversight
for transnational corporate activity is not the most effective way of ensuring
compliance; rather, entrusting an organization’s internal competencies to address
these risks with the GPs and corporate governance may provide a more effective
means of resolving the issue. But over the last four World Cup cycles, FIFA has
perpetuated a culture of corruption within its organization, engaged in business
activities carrying a high degree of adverse human rights risks, and eschewed
responsibility for its actions.165 In this case, relying on internal corporate
governance to address and remedy these issues is not sufficient; external state
pressure will provide the necessary push toward better compliance.
Moreover, there is a concern that increasing FIFA’s liability for human rights
abuses connected to the World Cup will lead the organization to avoid awarding
the World Cup to developing nations with inadequate human rights protections.
This risk-mitigation strategy could lead to a Euro-centric preference for megaevents and foreclose investment opportunities in developing countries.166 Beyond
that, this strategy would run “counterproductive” to “FIFA’s mission of
promoting values through competition” and “be an evasion of responsibility” by
undermining “the advancing of human rights through sport by inadvertently
ignoring human rights entirely, especially to the detriment of developing
countries.”167 For countries like Qatar, the awarding of the World Cup can provide
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substantial economic opportunity for migrant laborers. 168 The demand for labor
increased because FIFA gave the hosting rights to a nation where significant
infrastructure development was a prerequisite for a successful tournament.
Foreclosing these opportunities could place these laborers in an even worse
position. Alternate options for work may not exist and, assuming opportunities
do exist, there is no guarantee that the labor conditions would be any better.
A related adverse effect of FIFA’s refusal to award the World Cup to nations
that rely on migrant workers involves the global redistribution of wealth. 169 By
providing ample economic opportunities to some of the poorest individuals in the
neighboring regions, Qatar has subsequently spurred large-scale wealth
redistribution. Thus, large-scale spending on World Cup infrastructure facilitates
the flow of wealth to neighboring countries given the tendency for migrant
workers to remit payments back home. A hard law regime that incentivizes FIFA
to not award tournaments to nations with subpar human rights standards ignores
the benefits of economic opportunities for migrant workers who would not
otherwise have access to such.
This example illustrates a broader concern for firms seeking to conduct
operations in foreign nations. Corporate risk-mitigation strategies will likely
consider increased organizational liability in transnational business activities as a
significant deterrence. The benefits of investing in projects in developing
nations—whether due to cheaper labor or favorable government guarantees—
may be offset by an increased cost of doing business in these nations. Uncertainty
in risk lessens the likelihood of pursuing a transnational business venture in the
first place. This could ultimately lead to a general aversion toward transactional,
economically beneficial business activities in nations that stand to benefit the most
from them, further advancing wealth disparities between established and
developing nations.
The TCLT places FIFA in a precarious position. Organizational
accountability and transparency are no longer optional under this proposed treaty
regime. Although the risk of incentivizing FIFA to divest in developing countries
exists, external influence may make this reality unlikely. If FIFA shied away from
hosting tournaments in these regions, its actions would be inconsistent with its
core organizational strategy to grow and develop the game around the world.170
Yes, FIFA’s history of weak corporate governance offers little to suggest that, in
the face of liability, it will remain consistent with its purported strategy. External
factors, however, mitigate this concern. In order to retain its favorable tax status
in various jurisdictions, FIFA cannot deviate from its statutory objective to
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promote the game in all parts of the world.171 Completely avoiding investments in
developing countries may suggest a reevaluation of its status as an association
under Swiss law, for example.172 This monetary incentive may push FIFA in the
right direction.
Assuming FIFA does not wish to neglect certain nations in the future, the
organization could employ two strategies to mitigate its own impacts on human
rights, while also avoiding neglecting entire regions out of fear of liability. For
example, extensive pre-tournament analysis and preparation could substantially
reduce human rights impacts. FIFA can use its economic bargaining power and
political leverage over host countries to extract government guarantees to respect
and protect international human rights standards. For the 2022 World Cup, FIFA
was in an excellent position to predicate hosting rights on actual labor reforms.
The bidding process for the tournament was quite competitive, with technically
superior bids from nations such as the United States and Australia receiving
significant support. FIFA could have used the external pressure from other bids
to leverage more comprehensive human rights protections from Qatar. Instead,
FIFA’s complicit passivity morphed into liability.
In a similar manner, companies looking to invest in business activities in
foreign nations can use their economic and political leverage to demand change.
These companies arguably possess as much bargaining power as FIFA due to the
likelihood of a long-term relationship and repeat interactions with the foreign
nation. FIFA’s presence, on the other hand, vanishes after the completion of the
tournament.
To be sure, the implementation of the TCLT brings forth serious
considerations about how to enforce greater protections for human rights without
deterring regional investment, including investments that could contribute to
reducing global inequality.173 The rise in the global economy has allowed
corporations to extend their reach into every region on earth, and transnational
business activities result in economic impacts beyond a corporation’s domicile.
Companies may operate in other countries for low-cost labor, lax regulations, or
favorable tax regimes. But this is a two-way street. Corporations should internalize
more of the social costs of their business activities to incentivize actual change. A
stricter liability regime in a corporation’s domicile may lead the organization to a
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crossroads: develop better internal procedures to mitigate or eliminate these risks
or avoid the business opportunity together.
For a corporation entirely focused on maximizing profits—that is not to
imply that FIFA has not taken this same route—the cost of ensuring compliance
and avoiding liability may outweigh the benefits of a foreign business investment.
On the other hand, countries may also refuse to change their behavior due to
nationwide costs associated with re-evaluating labor and human rights standards.
Yet, this dichotomy in decision-making does not have to be the default. A large
corporation will have considerable political and economic power when deciding
where to invest. In a similar manner to World Cup host-nation selection, a
corporation can utilize its positional advantage to mitigate social costs from its
operations. For example, a transnational corporation may choose to alter or give
up certain government guarantees such as tax breaks in exchange for guarantees
surrounding higher labor standards or worker protections.
Likewise, transnational business entities can develop internal strategies to
reduce the threat of liability from the harmful impacts of their business activities.
This may include extensive pre-investment analysis of human rights risks or
contract provisions allowing the parties to unilaterally rescind the agreement if the
other party fails to meet pre-determined human rights standards. These strategies
may be a more attractive alternative to foregoing the investment opportunity
altogether. Furthermore, courts can hold accountable companies that wish to
cultivate the benefits of foreign business opportunities without a human rights
strategy.

B. Unanswered Questions
Due to the novelty of the TCLT, substantial questions remain regarding the
treaty’s procedure and effect. These considerations will likely shape how the treaty
functions. For example, under Article IV, victims retain the right to submit claims
through a representative or a class action.174 It remains to be seen how NGOs will
influence the litigation of these cases. Because many of these migrant laborers do
not have access to adequate legal resources, and because the process for bringing
claims in a foreign court is a high barrier to entry, these laborers may rely on
NGOs to represent them in court.175 This is especially necessary in countries like
Qatar where migrant workers cannot form trade unions to represent their
interests.
For example, in FNV & Nadim Shariful Alam v. FIFA, a Nepalese migrant
laborer brought a claim in Zurich, Switzerland against FIFA for human rights
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abuses connected to World Cup infrastructure development.176 A Nepalese trade
union and Dutch law firm represented the worker. Bringing this claim required
substantial support from third parties, such as the trade union. Even though the
TCLT calls for domestic laws that provide victims adequate access to remedies,
practical considerations of a migrant laborer bringing a claim in a different state
limits that access. Additionally, the use of class action litigation may work in the
laborer’s favor against large organizations like FIFA. For significant projects like
the World Cup, it may be easier to aggregate the claims under the same operative
facts, such as construction on a stadium, and threaten significant liability against
FIFA. The aggregate value of all the claims may incentivize FIFA to settle these
harms before litigation and structure its future affairs to avoid liability.
Furthermore, FIFA’s status as an association under Swiss law may affect the
limits of the TCLT’s reach. FIFA may try to argue for exemption from the treaty’s
scope because it operates as an association rather than a traditional business
enterprise, and the latter is what the TCLT purportedly aims to regulate.177 This is
not a winnable argument. FIFA’s organizational structure lends itself to two
functions, one as an association and the other as a business enterprise. The
organization conducts licensing, sponsorship deals, and tournament activities that
bring in substantial revenue.178 These functions, given the size and scope of
FIFA’s operations, look much more like business activities of a typical
corporation.179 The TCLT defines business activity as “any economic or other
activity.”180 This means that, even though FIFA is an association, it is still engaging
in economic activities to fund its operations.
An analysis of FIFA’s financial statements shows that a majority of its
expenses go directly to the implementation of the World Cup. Therefore, it may
be the case that FIFA is not utilizing its funds to adequately fund its own
purported organizational goal. Rather, the organization is expending a majority of
its cash flow on the World Cup.181 Yes, successfully implementing the World Cup
involves substantial expenditures. These costs, however, ultimately generate a
large profit for FIFA. The lack of human rights safeguards during the tournament
cycle in Qatar suggests that a crossover between hosting the World Cup and
improving social welfare through the sport does not necessarily exist. The World
Cup, as a profit-driven mega-event, appears to exist independently of socially
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beneficial programs and investments by FIFA. If FIFA’s organizational goal is to
address social welfare concerns, incurring substantial expenditures to implement
tournaments that are plagued with human rights abuses certainly fails to reach that
goal.182
On a related note, FIFA’s recent endorsement of the GPs and stated
commitment to implement the GPs within its statutory framework suggests that
the enterprise considers its operations to fall under the purview of business
activities covered by the GPs. FIFA’s activities as a business entity led to its
voluntary adoption of an adverse human-rights mitigation framework designed
for corporations. These elements place FIFA squarely within the scope the TCLT.
However, it is still unclear exactly how Switzerland will apply this law to
associations. Because the nation is host to a plethora of international sporting
organizations, the implementation of the TCLT could have broader effects on
these governing bodies.
Another potential question surrounding the TCLT’s reach is whether FIFA’s
World Cup corporate partners are exposed to any liability. FIFA’s corporate
partners, such as Adidas and Visa, “provide vital services and product support for
the entire event’s operations.”183 This agreement also grants the partners
advertising exposure in and around the stadium.184 This relationship is even more
powerful given the stadium commercial “exclusion zones” and corporate tax
breaks conceded by the government during the event.185 Although these
corporations are not involved in the actual development or construction of the
stadiums, the corporate partners reap the benefits of a contractual relationship
with FIFA and receive special legal protections granted by the host government
to protect their commercial interests.186 Here, the strongest defense against liability
claims will focus on the degree of separation and lack of direct involvement in the
perpetuation of these abuses. Yet, it can be argued that it was reasonably
foreseeable that FIFA, the organization with which these companies have a
business relationship, would cause or contribute to human rights abuses. These
corporations may be in an even greater position to alter FIFA’s actions because
of their influence as substantial stakeholders in the tournament implementation.
This idea, however, assumes FIFA is susceptible to stakeholder pressure, a notion
that the organization’s history seems to dispel. Yet, in the face of legal
consequences, corporate risk aversion may overcome FIFA’s resiliency against
stakeholders. These outside stakeholders are likely more susceptible to social
pressures to adhere to corporate social responsibility than FIFA is. It is important
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to note that, even though the corporate partners may be able to escape liability,
the potential threat of litigation may change the corporate risk calculus for
partnering with FIFA and influence how these entities contractually structure their
partnerships to mitigate adverse human rights impacts.
Lastly, a few key questions involving the TCLT’s implementation remain
unanswered. Because the TCLT is only in the proposal stage, it is unclear exactly
when the Working Group will finalize the treaty. Thus, FIFA’s liability under this
treaty is on hold until the TCLT goes into effect. This also means that the TCLT
could undergo significant structural changes during the next Working Group
negotiation session. After ratification, will migrant workers be able to sue for
claims arising before the instrument was enacted? For the most serious abuses,
the statute of limitations will perhaps not apply. However, this may operate
differently for smaller claims. Retroactive claims also present evidentiary problems
for migrant workers looking to bring suit years after a violation. Structuring and
presenting adequate claims in Swiss court may require NGOs to sort and assess
claims on the front end. These uncertainties will play an important role in when
and how migrant laborers will be able to seek remedies for past abuses.

VIII. C ONC LU SION
This Comment argues that, under the proposed legally binding instrument
set out by Council Resolution 26/9, FIFA is liable for contributing to human
rights violations connected to the 2022 FIFA World Cup in Qatar. Moreover, the
Comment balances countervailing considerations of regulation and
overdeterrence. Under the current international legal framework, domestic court
systems are ill-equipped to address human rights violations in foreign nations,
even when a domiciled entity perpetuates these violations. However, the
expansion of a domestic liability regime for transnational business activities could
deter organizations from investing in these regions. For example, FIFA may
decline to award World Cup hosting rights to regions with substandard human
rights records. Facially, this seems like a good idea: countries refusing to address
these issues will never receive a World Cup. Yet, this line of thinking misses two
critical considerations. First, countries that heavily rely on migrant labor, such as
Qatar, are providing substantial economic opportunities to those who would not
otherwise be able to reap the benefits of this labor demand. It may be the case
that countries like Qatar are contributing to global wealth redistribution to
laborers from the poorest countries in the world. Second, because of FIFA’s
economic and political leverage over these countries, the organization should be
able to bargain for improved human rights conditions as pre-requisites to hosting
the tournament. FIFA can and should utilize this leverage to enact greater social
change; if FIFA shies away from these types of countries when deciding to award
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the tournament, it loses the potential to utilize its leverage in places where it carries
the most weight.
The trade-off between increased international regulation and deterring
foreign investment poses a difficult problem with respect to transnational business
activities. Under the proposed legally binding instrument, third parties can hold
FIFA accountable for its contributions to human rights abuses in Qatar. Although
implementing a hard law regime may threaten FIFA’s investment, this Comment
argues that the legally binding instrument will provide the appropriate incentives
for FIFA to respect human rights during the World Cup process without
drastically affecting the organization’s risk calculus for the tournament. Yes, there
is a concern that this liability will cause FIFA to avoid granting World Cups to
“riskier” nations. This concern also extends to any firm’s approach to foreign
activities. Yet, an increased risk of liability does not equate to an increase in
liability. These organizations are in a great position to proactively mitigate these
issues through better internal social cost reduction strategies, government
guarantees, and mandated contractual structures that provide protection for
human rights. These factors will allow companies to respect human rights, limit
their exposure to liability, and still conduct transnational business activities in
developing nations. The treaty provides a push in the right direction.
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